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This article analyses the effectiveness of s.172(1) of the Companies Act, 2006. This was 
introduced in order to improve directorial decision-making in companies, in particular 
requiring company directors to have regard to the interests of various stakeholders. This 
approach was designed to promote “enlightened shareholder value”. While having regard to 
stakeholders’ interests is not in itself a bad idea, the manner in which this requirement was 
drafted proved unsatisfactory, in particular its lack of enforceability. The many financial 
scandals starting from around 2008 indicated that mere lip-service had been paid to the 
requirement. Ironically, directors are now having to do what the Parliamentarians hoped 
s.172(1)  would achieve, mainly because of the reputational hazard for those companies if 
they continued in their previous ways, but not because of s.172(1) itself. It is suggested that 
s.172(1) is cumbersome and toothless, and that any review of company law should use the 




The background to “enlightened shareholder value” 
During the 1990s the then Department of Trade and Industry set up a Company Law Steering 
Group to look critically at many aspects of company law, at the time regulated under the 
Companies Act 1985. After much deliberation it produced Modern Company Law for a 
competitive economy – the Final Report.2 This Report took evidence from a wide range of 
interests and experts on how to improve company law. Existing company law was seen to be 
full of unnecessary rules, to be confusing for company directors, and not wholly conducive to 
the setting up of businesses or retaining businesses in the UK. The Companies Act 2006 
(“CA 2006”) eventually was developed from this Report. The opportunity was taken to 
enshrine in statute various European company law requirements3 and to tidy up the law 
relating to capital maintenance. Many other uncontroversial, sensible and worthwhile reforms 
were made to the process of incorporating companies, managing them, and removing them 
from existence. However, there were some controversial parts, and one that was at the time 
possibly the most controversial finally emerged as section 172(1), shown below.  
 
Duty to promote the success of the company 
(1) A director of a company must act in the way he considers, in good faith, would be most 
likely to promote the success of the company for the benefit of its members as a whole, and in 
doing so have regard (amongst other matters) to—  
                                                     
1 Senior Lecturer, Edinburgh Napier University 
2 Published by the DTI in July 2001 
3 In particular the EC Thirteenth Company Law Directive on Takeover Bids (2004/25). 
(a) the likely consequences of any decision in the long term,  
(b) the interests of the company's employees,  
(c) the need to foster the company's business relationships with suppliers, 
customers and others,  
(d) the impact of the company's operations on the community and the 
environment,  
(e) the desirability of the company maintaining a reputation for high standards of 
business conduct, and  
(f) the need to act fairly as between members of the company.  
 
This sought to move the law away from the classic view that the paramount concern of 
directors was to maintain shareholder value: the directors were not obliged to take anything 
else into account except insofar as it benefitted the company and thereby indirectly the 
shareholders. In short, directors were not expected in their management of the company to 
display any particular sense of social responsibility: that might be a job for politicians but 
was not the job of directors. The best known exposition of this approach was put forward by 
the economist, Milton Friedman.4 In his view anything other than making profits was 
effectively a tax on shareholders. Such a view was not held by the advancers of the CA 2006 
s.172(1) who took the wider view that although directors should act in a way that benefits the 
shareholders, they should in the process positively take account of other stakeholders in the 
company, and should act in a thoughtful, inclusive way, looking to the future, considering the 
implications of their decisions for their customers, creditors, employees, the local 
neighbourhood, shareholders generally (as opposed to any favoured group of shareholders) 
and establishing a reputation for “high standards of business conduct”.  The essential duty of 
the directors was to promote the success of the company and in the process to “have regard” 
to these various requirements. This was said to lead to “enlightened shareholder value” on the 
grounds that directors who did this in the long run would create favourable conditions for the 
long-term prosperity of the company itself, its shareholders and its employees.5 This article 
does not propose to discuss the various academic theories of company law in relation to this 
concept, nor propose to discuss whether or not enlightened shareholder value is juristically 
sound; this is because this article’s focus is purely on directors’ practical application of the 




Section 172(1) attracted controversy for various reasons, mainly because from a lawyer’s 
point of view it is vague and confusing. It is not clear how much regarding is necessary, or 
how regarding needs to be evidenced. The legislation does not explain if it is necessary 
specifically to have regard to each item in turn and to have noted it down in board minutes. 
The list of matters to which the directors should have regard does not indicate what should 
                                                     
4 “There is one and only one social responsibility of business–to use its resources and engage 
in activities designed to increase its profits so long as it stays within the rules of the game, 
which is to say, engages in open and free competition without deception or fraud.”  The 
social responsibility of business is to increase its profits: New York Times, 13 September 
1970.  
5 See Lord Sainsbury of Turville’s speech in the House of Lords on 11 Jan 2006 Vol 677 HL 
Col.244.   
happen if regarding one matter causes problems for another matter. The words “promote the 
success” of the company are not explained, nor is there any indication as to who decides what 
is meant by “success”. 
 
The Government indicated that the regarding should not be a mere box-ticking exercise6 and 
that directors should genuinely try to engage with the requirements of the legislation; it is 
clear that the choice of the words “have regard” was deliberate.7 Regarding is also something 
more easily carried out in a large company by a large board of directors with a company 
secretary. It is less likely to be carried out, if at all, by a small unaudited company with one or 
two shareholders. In practice, at least in a large company where corporate governance is 
taken seriously, the minutes of board meetings will record the fact that directors duly took 
account of the requirements of s.172(1). If there is any particularly contentious matter that 
would have a significant impact on any of the matters in s.172(1) the minutes will generally 
go into more detail to prove that the directors genuinely did have regard to that matter and did 
not arbitrarily make their decision without proper consideration. The point is that directors 
should have been seen to have at least had “regard” to the matter, even if in fact they made a 
decision that was detrimental to the particular matter under consideration. It would appear 
that provided that there is a paper trail to show that the matter have been thought about, that 
would be evidence enough to a court or to a liquidator that the directors had been carrying out 
their task properly. Courts are well known to be reluctant to review commercial decisions. 
The problem with the phrase “have regard” would appear to lie in the fact that it meant one 
thing to politicians and another to lawyers. The phrase “have regard” is conspicuously vague. 
It is a portmanteau phrase, a phrase that can accommodate a wide range of meanings 
depending on what one wants it to mean. Such a phrase is not ideal in legislation.  
 
 
The duty owed to the company 
The obligation to “have regard” to the various matters in s.172(1) is a duty owed by the 
directors – but a duty that is not owed to, say, the environment or the employees, but, as 
specified in s.171, only to the company. This means that a representative of the environment 
(a local councillor, perhaps) or an employee affected by a decision of the directors, has no 
standing under s.172(1) under which to sue the directors. Only the company, the collective 
body of shareholders, (or a member exercising a derivative claim on behalf of the company) 
may exercise the sanction of suing the directors for the directors’ failure to “have regard” to 
those matters. This would presuppose that the collective body of shareholders (who might, in 
any case, be the same people as the directors) feels sufficiently strongly about the matter to 
bring an action against the directors for the directors’ failure to have regard to the 
environment or the employees. The company would normally need to have particularly 
altruistic shareholders for this to happen.  
 
A graver threat to the directors is that if the company went into liquidation, the liquidator 
would then represent the collective body of shareholders, and could investigate the then 
directors’ decision-making by reference to past minutes, and if necessary, take action against 
the directors for their failure to “have regard” to any of the matters in s.172(1).8 The failure to 
                                                     
6 Se Lord Sainsbury above at Col. 245.  
7 See Alastair Darling’s speech in the House of Commons at Hansard, HC Vol. 447, col.125 
(June 6, 2006). 
8 It may also be open to the liquidator to use the provisions of s.172(3) against directors who 
under common law had failed to consider the interests of creditors when the directors could 
have regard could also be seen as misfeasance under s.212 of the Insolvency Act 1986.  
Another threat to directors who have been failing to “have regard” is when the existing 
shareholders, or a majority thereof, sell their shares to a purchaser who then has control of the 
company. The purchaser might choose to examine the company’s past board minutes and see 
the extent to which the directors had failed to “have regard”. If the directors had taken some 
contentious decisions, and there was no evidence that in doing so they had had regard to the 
matters in s.172(1), it might be open to the purchaser, now representing the company, to raise 
an action against the directors for breach of their duty.  
This approach (that in principle only the company could sue the directors for their failure to 
take account the requirements of s.172(1)) was based on Companies Act 1985 s.309 which 
used the same principle. This was introduced into the Companies Act 1980 by the then 
Conservative government.  While Professor Davies in Gower and Davies Principles of 
Modern Company Law9 asserts that it was not clear whether the draftsmen of s.309 were 
adopting a pluralist approach (i.e. employees in their own right are a specific matter of 
consideration by directors, separate from the directors’ overall concern for shareholders) or 
an enlightened shareholder value approach (i.e. that employees were a matter, but one of 
many others, that should be considered in terms of what was best for shareholders), it is 
suggested, though it cannot be unequivocably established, that the ambiguity of s.309 was 
deliberate. As part of the UK’s entry to the EEC, now European Union, in 1973 there was an 
expectation that UK company legislation should give recognition to workers’ rights10, a view 
supported by some in Europe but not a view always held by directors within the UK. The UK 
Government, at that time under a Conservative administration, produced a form of wording 
for s.309 which looked as though directors had to consider workers’ interests (thus apparently 
satisfying the EU requirements) but the requirement to do so was actually a duty owed to the 
company, not to the workers themselves (thus not actually fettering directors’ capacity to 
manage their companies).11  In practice, this rendered the section almost worthless, as may 
possibly have been intended. Unless the employees formed a majority of the shareholders, 
there would be little occasion for the shareholders to exercise their rights under s.309. Despite 
the fact that s.309 was toothless, when the time came to reform the law for the CA 2006, the 
then Government (by this stage under Labour control) chose to use the same principle for 
s.172(1).  
 
The predicament for Parliament  
The decision to limit the extent of directors’ responsibility to having “regard”, and for only 
the company to be able to enforce this duty, was taken in the knowledge that anything more 
                                                                                                                                                                     
see the company was in financial difficulties. Re HLC Environmental Projects Ltd, [2013] 
EWHC 2876 (Ch). 
9 At 16.33 
10 Employee participation and company structure in the European Community. COM (75) 
570 12 November 1975. Bulletin of the European Communities, Supplement 8/75 
11 The wording of s.309 was as follows: 
(1) The matters to which the directors of a company are to have regard in the 
performance of their functions include the interests of the company's employees in general, as 
well as the interests of its members. 
(2) Accordingly, the duty imposed by this section on the directors is owed by them to the 
company (and the company alone) and is enforceable in the same way as any other fiduciary 
duty owed to a company by its directors. 
(3) This section applies to shadow directors as it does to directors. 
onerous could be seen as a positive deterrent to entrepreneurs setting up companies in the UK 
or existing businesses staying in the UK. If any stakeholder, as opposed to the company, 
could sue the directors for the directors’ failure to have regard to the stakeholder’s interests, 
few directors of companies would wish to keep their businesses in the UK. This was a good 
reason for not extending rights to the stakeholders themselves.12 It is also possible, but 
probably impossible to establish, that the restricting to the company of the right to sue 
directors for breach of their duty to have regard to the various matters in s.172(1) was a legal 
point not wholly comprehended by all MPs at Westminster. Owing a duty to a company to 
promote the success of a company by having regard to various matters is a complex concept 
for those not versed in company law. However, it gives the superficial impression that 
stakeholders’ interests will at least be considered, or ought to be considered by the directors, 
and that there is a sanction for non-performance by the directors. And of course, it should not 
be forgotten that the directors of well-run companies generally do take account of 
stakeholders’ interests. If companies wish to remain successful and prosperous, it does not 
seem unreasonable to expect directors to do this. It is the question of compulsion that is 
problematic.  
 
As already indicated, the sanction for non-compliance, an action by the company against the 
directors, is very unlikely to take place unless the general body of shareholders is 
uncharacteristically selfless. The fact that its previous iteration in s.309 of the Companies Act 
1985 had not obviously proved effectual in safeguarding employee interests did not prevent 
its re-use in s.172(1). It is as if the politicians promoting it touchingly thought that this time it 
might work – or perhaps no-one could think of any better solution to the incompatible 
objectives of politicians’ not wishing to stifle directors’ desire to manage their companies 
without too much hindrance from the law, and politicians’ desire to make directors take 
account of wider social interests when managing their companies. Although there were 
attempts to clarify the meaning of the section by amendment at the time that it was being 
voted upon by the House of Commons, the amendment was withdrawn to avoid a potential 
later battle within the House of Lords, with Margaret Hodge giving a spirited defence of the 
existing wording, confident that it would achieve its intended purpose. The wording was duly 
approved without further discussion and with a comfortable majority.13  
 
The extent to which s.172(1) has been discussed in the courts 
Since s.172(1) of the Companies Act 2006 came into force14, as explained in the next 
paragraph, there have been a few cases that refer to s.172(1)(f), where the petitioner is a 
member of the company and seeking redress for the benefit of the company for not being 
treated properly15, but only one16 where there was an attempt to raise court action for the 
failure to have regard to the various matters in s.172(1)(a)-(e). This could mean that: 
                                                     
12 At the time of the House of Commons second reading discussion on this section of what 
was then the Companies Bill, (17 October 2006) various MPs alluded to lobbying by the 





content/uploads/2013/11/Companies_Bill_Supporter_Verdict__Long_Nov061.pdf   
13  Hansard, House of Commons, 17 October 2006, Vol. 450 column 790.  
14 1st October 2007. 
15 For example, West Coast Capital (LIOS) Limited, Petitioner, [2008] CSOH 72.  
• although the right to petition in respect of any of those matters exists, such a right is 
not a realistic way of solving a problem involving directors’ neglect of the stakeholder 
interests indicated in s.172(1)(a)-(e); 
• liquidators have other, generally more certain, means of seeking redress from past 
directors (in particular, s.172(3));  
• liquidators and incoming shareholders are not particularly interested in whether or not 
the past directors had regard to any other stakeholders, or are not prepared to spend 
money finding out; 
• most shareholders do not know about s.172(1)(a)-(e) or if they do, do not care about it 
enough to do anything about it; 
• the cost of bringing a petition puts potential petitioners off; 
• even if the petitioner has a point, the bad publicity that would be attracted to the 
company by a court case would probably have a deleterious effect on the company’s 
share price; 
• if there are problems with a listed company’s directors, by far the easiest solution is to 
sell its shares17; 
• directors are often not worth suing. 
 
The derivative claim 
Hitherto it has been suggested that to enforce s.172(1), the company would have to take 
action against a director. This could be done by a derivative claim, a statutory procedure, 
provided for under ss.260-269 of the Act, which allows a shareholder, on behalf of the 
company, to raise an action on the company’s behalf and for its benefit against a director. 
There already has been a number of cases, in every case so far in small companies, where a 
shareholder has taken advantage of the new derivative claim to petition the court for redress 
for some mischief done to the company by a director.18 Under the derivative claim, an 
aggrieved shareholder who believes that a director has neglected his duty to promote the 
success of the company for the benefit of its members as a whole may petition the court for 
permission to represent the company in an action against that director. The petitioner has to 
persuade the court that he has a prima facie case19 against the director for the director’s 
breach of duty, and if the petition is successful, and the court allows the case to proceed with 
the shareholder now representing the company, any damages payable by the director for his 
failure to promote the success of the company would be payable to the company.20 A good 
example is Hughes v Weiss21 where a company was set up by two lawyers with the intention 
of providing consultancy advice on various financial matters. Both lawyers had equal shares 
in the ownership and management of the company, and both were directors, but Weiss took it 
                                                                                                                                                                     
16 R.(on the application of People and Planet) v H.M. Treasury, [2009] EWHC 3020 (Admin), 
discussed shortly. This was not actually an action against the directors but a review of the way that the 
Government as the majority shareholders was running the company.   
17 Petitioning the court about the directors’ decision-making would be expensive and might 
even lead to the share price being adversely affected. 
18 For example, Wishart Ptnr [2009] CSOH 20;  Phoenix Contracts (Leicester) Ltd  [2010] 
EWHC 2375; 
19 For an explanation of what would be considered a prima facie case, see Gillespie v 
Toondale Ltd, 2006 S.C. 304.   
20 Not to the member himself. He is merely acting on the company’s behalf and obtains little 
personal benefit except insofar as any redress from the director benefits the company and 
thereby indirectly the value of the member’s shares.  
21 [2012] EWHC 2363 (Ch). 
upon himself to seize a large proportion of the company’s funds, claiming that he was entitled 
to it for various reasons which the judge found unconvincing. The court held that Hughes had 
made out a prima facie case that Weiss had failed to act fairly as between the members in 
terms of s.172(1)(f).22  
 
Indeed, the case law to date on derivative claims at present seems to be limited to members 
being treated badly by the directors in terms of s.172(1)(f) (acting fairly as between members 
of the company). Only one reported case so far has been an attempt to get anyone to pay 
attention to the matters in s.172(1), (a)-(e). This case was R.(on the application of People and 
Planet) v H.M. Treasury,23 where a pressure group sought judicial review of the way that a 
Government company, UK Financial Investment Ltd, which represented the Government’s 
interest in Royal Bank of Scotland, and which owned 70% of that bank’s equity, was run by 
the Treasury. The pressure group felt that as the Government effectively owned so much of 
the Royal Bank, the Bank should be run in accordance with the interests of Companies Act 
2006 s.172(1) in mind, in particular paying attention to climate change and human rights. The 
application was unsuccessful, and permission for judicial review was not granted, on the 
grounds that the Treasury had taken some account of such matters, but there were many other 
matters also to be considered by directors and due weight had to be given to them too. 
Climate change and human rights could not have a priority when it came to the amount of 
regard directors were required to pay to the various matters in s.172(1). A balance had to be 
found with all the other interests.  In any case, while the Treasury could put its views across 
to the board of directors of the Royal Bank of Scotland, ultimately it was for the directors to 
manage the bank and not for the Treasury.24 If this is the only case that even approaches the 
use of s.172(1)(a)-(e)25 it suggests that in the seven years since it has been enacted, either 
these provisions have not proved useful from the point of view of the various stakeholders 
concerned, or that no-one has been willing to launch a test case.  
 
However, merely because stakeholders have paid little attention to s.172(1) in the courts does 
not mean that directors are completely unaware of stakeholders’ interests, or are unaware that 
the legislation is trying to persuade directors to consider stakeholders’ interests. The 
Government commissioned a review of the Companies Act 2006 in 2010. The review 
established that most company directors were aware of s.172(1) of the Act, but were not 
necessarily putting it into practice.26  
 
Apart from s.172(1), what other guidance for directorial decision-making is there? 
 
There is no lack of guidance in the UK to encourage the proper and honest management of 
companies by directors. The Financial Reporting Council has a strong interest in ensuring the 
probity of accounts. Listed companies are obliged to follow the UK Corporate Governance 
                                                     
22 At paras 34-41. A similar case exemplifying the use of s.172(1)(f) is Phillips v Fryer 
[2013] B.C.C. 176. 
23 [2009] EWHC 3020 (Admin) 
24 At para.35. For a critique of this decision, see Copp, S.172 of the Companies Act 2006 fails 
people and planet? Comp. Law. 2010, 31(12), 406-408.  
25 In any case, this application was for judicial review, and was not a derivative claim. 
26 S. Fettiplace and R. Addis, Evaluation of the Companies Act 2006 (2 August 2010), at p.3 
of summary, available at http://www.bis.gov.uk/assets/biscore/business-law/docs/e/10-1363-
evaluation-companies-act-2006-summary-main-findings.pdf   
Code.27 Its requirement for directors to “comply or explain” with generally accepted good 
practice within the terms of the Code is well understood.  Finally, many large companies over 
the last few years have adopted “statements of values” or internal ethical codes in an effort to 




However, notwithstanding the existence of CA 2006 s.172(1), the Corporate Governance 
Code and various statements of values, recent business history suggests that in certain sectors 
of business, in particular banking, directors of companies have not been paying any attention 
to any of these requirements. Some recent scandals include the following:  
 
• The sub-prime mortgage scandal. The scandal is well known and much analysed.29 
Because of the complexity of the business, the lack of transparency in what was being 
traded, and over-reliance on rating agencies, few people in the financial institutions 
that traded in sub-prime paper really appreciated what was involved. In retrospect 
questions might have been asked about the long term value of these investments and 
whether it was wise to be so reliant on them. What may never be known is the extent 
to which banks’ directors took the trouble to find out about sub-prime paper and its 
true worth. 
 
• A report for the US Senate indicated that HSBC had been laundering money 
(particularly of “hot” South and Central American money) for years.30  The report 
indicates that the US arm of the bank was woefully understaffed and out of its depth 
in its compliance and anti-money laundering departments.31 While the bank did not 
hide its involvement in these questionable practices in its 2010 annual report,32 its 
compliance statement did not reveal any difficulties.33 Its compliance statement in 
                                                     
27 Available at http://www.frc.org.uk/Our-Work/Codes-Standards/Corporate-governance/UK-
Corporate-Governance-Code.aspx  
28 For examples, see the ethical code produced by Barclays Bank The Barclays Way: How we 
do business ussued in September 2013.    
29 In particular, Michael Lewis, The Big Short, Inside the Doomsday Machine , Penguin, 
2011.  
30 US Vulnerability to Money-laundering, drugs, and terrorist financing: HSBC case history,  
Permanent Sub-committee on Investigations, US Senate, December 2012 available at 
http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/subcommittees/investigations/media/levin-statement-on-hsbc-
settlement 
31 David Bagley, the UK head of compliance during the time of the money-laundering, 
resigned during the Senate Sub-committee hearing on HSBC’s money-laundering activities, 
blaming the bank’s rapid growth and challenging circumstances, implicitly admitting his own 
inability to prevent the abuses that had been taking place under his watch. 
32 See HSBC’s annual report for 2010 at page 82.  
33 The following is from the 2010 HSBC annual report at p.154 under the heading of 
“Compliance risk”. 
“Compliance risk falls within the definition of operational risk. All Group companies are 
required to observe the letter and spirit of all relevant laws, codes, rules, regulations and 
standards of good market practice. These rules, regulations, other standards and Group 
policies include those relating to anti-money laundering, counter terrorist financing and 
sanctions compliance. The Group Compliance function supports line management in ensuring 
that report said that all group companies were required to comply with the 
requirement to observe the letter and spirit of all relevant laws, but it did not indicate 
that they had actually done so.  
 
• Standard Chartered bank, despite the existence of sanctions against dealing with Iran, 
persistently ignored those sanctions over a period of ten years up to 2010.34 This is in 
contrast to the values espoused by the bank in its annual report for the year 2010.35  
 
• At the time of writing, there is an unfolding scandal about interest rate swaps being 
forced upon borrowers by banks as a condition of loan.36 
 
• The US subsidiary of UK company, GlaxoSmithKline, was fined $3 billion in July 
2012 for deliberately withholding vital safety data about its best-selling diabetes drug, 
Avandia, and in particular the effect of that drug on hearts. The company had also 
been paying bribes to doctors and recommending unsuitable anti-depressants to 
children.37 
 
• SSE, formerly South of Scotland Electricity, formally admitted breaches of mis-
selling electricity and was fined £10.3 million by Ofgem on 3 March 2013. While 
there was no suggestion that senior management actively participated in the mis-
selling or was wilfully in breach of the company’s licence conditions, senior 
                                                                                                                                                                     
that there are adequate policies and procedures, and is responsible for maintaining adequate 
resources to mitigate compliance risk. The GMO Compliance department oversees the global 
compliance function and is headed by the Head of Group Compliance who in turn reports to 
the Group Chief Risk Officer. There are compliance teams in all of the countries where we 
operate. These compliance teams are principally overseen by Regional Compliance Officers 
located in Europe, North America, Latin America, the Middle East and Asia-Pacific. Group 
Compliance policies and procedures require the prompt identification and escalation to GMO 
Compliance of all actual or suspected breaches of any law, rule, regulation, Group policy or 
other relevant requirement. These escalation procedures are supplemented by a requirement 
for the submission of compliance certificates at the half-year and year-end by all Group 
companies detailing any known breaches as above. The contents of these escalation and 
certification processes are used for reporting to the Risk Management Meeting, the Group 
Risk Committee and the Board and disclosure in the Annual Report and Accounts and Interim 
Report, if appropriate.” 
34 See 10 December 2012 BBC business news http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-
20669650.   
35 See in particular, page 39, where the following is stated: “Our brand promise, Here for 
good, reaches out to all our stakeholders, including our employees, through a simple and 
compelling promise. It says who we are, what we stand for and what makes us different. Here 
for good captures our genuine commitment to our customers and clients, our staff and the 
communities where we operate; our focus on consistently doing the right thing and acting 
responsibly; and our aim to continually lead the way across Asia, Africa and the Middle East. 




37 BBC News, US and Canada, 2 July 2012. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-
18673220 . 
management was criticised for its non-involvement in compliance and oversight of 
sales activities, and its reluctance to consider that commission-hungry salesmen might 
not be treating the company’s customers properly.38  
 
These are some scandals that are known. There may be others still hidden or sufficiently 
successful that they have yet to surface. All these scandals took place within British banks 
and other British companies or in their foreign but British-controlled subsidiaries. With 
regard to CA 2006 s.172(1), these scandals have not been good either for the shareholders or 
customers, let alone the banks’ reputations for high standards of business practice. New 
management has been imposed in some of these banks since the scandals, and there have 
been protestations of the need for new standards of conduct, a new culture, retraining and no 
repetition of improper behaviour.39 But while the improper practices were taking place, there 
was little suggestion in the annual reports that anything was amiss. The question then arises: 
to what extent did the directors of the banks at the time know what was going on? If they did, 
they were in breach of Companies Act 2006 s.172(1); and if they did not know, the question 
arises of why they did not know.  
 
Awareness of s.172(1) 
It will probably never be known whether the various directors in the various companies above 
genuinely were unaware of unsatisfactory practices within their firms, vaguely knew what 
was going on, encouraged or turned a blind eye to the more disreputable practices, or even 
delighted in their “gaming”40. There may have been a culture of wilful ignorance, so that 
directors could plead ignorance of their employees’ misdeeds and thus escape liability, or of 
creative compliance.41 While no director working at a senior level can be expected to know 
every dubious activity of his employees, it may be worth asking what steps directors took to 
ensure that any dubious activity was stamped out. All these companies had Audit and Risk 
committees on which directors will have sat. Those directors should have been mindful of the 
requirements of s.172(1), in particular the requirement to have regard to the interests of 
customers and to maintain a reputation for high standards of business conduct. It is most 
unlikely that the UK directors of the major banks above, or of GlaxoSmithKline and ESS, 
could have been unaware of s.172(1) and its requirements. These companies had company 
                                                     
38 See the Ofgem’s SSE – Notice of Intention to impose a financial penalty on SSE for failure 
to comply with Standard Licence Conditions 23 and 25 at paras. 134 and 149, 3 March 2013.  
39 For example, the chief executive, Sir Anthony Jenkins, of Barclays Bank, in an echo of 
Barclays Bank’s original Quaker roots, wrote to all the bank’s employees on 16 January 2013 
about his new mantra called TRANSFORM, promoting the values of “respect, integrity, 
service, excellence and stewardship”.  Similar assertions were made by the directors of the 
Royal Bank of Scotland to the Treasury Select Committee on 11February 2013. 
40 Andrew Bailey of the FSA told the Treasury Select Committee on 16th July 2012 that 
Barclays had a “culture of gaming” (i.e. sailing close to the wind in its compliance with 
regulations) and implied that that culture came from Bob Diamond, its then CEO.   
41 Doreen McBarnet , Corporate Social Responsibility Beyond Law, Through Law, for Law, 
University of Edinburgh - School of Law, March, 27 2009,  Working Paper No. 2009/03, 
available at  http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1369305  . 
Doreen McBarnet, Financial Engineering or Legal Engineering? Legal Work, Legal Integrity 
and the Banking Crisis, University of Edinburgh - School of Law, February 2, 2010, working 
paper series, 2010/02, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1546486 .  
secretaries who would have ensured that directors had been told about the changes in the law 
from October 2007 to reflect s.172(1) coming into force.  
 
However, being told about s.172(1) is one thing: paying attention to it is another. A proper 
adherence to s.172(1) should have ensured that certain lucrative but questionable activities, 
such as money-laundering and mis-selling, did not take place. However, if, as described 
earlier, the sanction for non-adherence to s.172(1) is weak, and if there is a general culture of 
creative compliance with legislation anyway, a director has much to lose by adherence to 
s.172(1). Many of the directors, and other employees, were shareholders themselves, had 
generous bonus schemes and were entitled to share options which could be triggered on 
certain targets being achieved. It would not be in those persons’ interests to query anything 
that in the short term might adversely affect the share price or their bonuses or their 
promotion prospects; and it is interesting to note that one of the remedies that is now being 
proposed, particularly for the banks, is that directors and other senior executives should only 
be able to obtain certain benefits or bonuses if the company obtains long term gain, not 
merely short term market share or an increase in the share price obtained by rent-seeking 
officials.42 
 
To put the matter succinctly, the sort of directors who would have taken account of s.172 
would not need to be told to do so, and the sort of directors who ought to have been reminded 
of s.172 would not have troubled themselves about it anyway, because, it is suggested, there 
was no compulsion to adhere to its terms and little likelihood of any punishment for their 
failure to do so.43  It is possible to point to companies that probably did, and probably still do, 
all that is required under s.172(1) – The John Lewis Partnership is a good example – but they 
would have done so anyway because a company where the directors do take account of a 
wide range of stakeholder interests probably is quite a thoughtfully run company. Staff are 
valued, customers and suppliers treated properly, and the business is well regarded in the 
community. The irony of s.172(1) is that intrinsically what it expects directors to do makes a 
good deal of sense, but in the absence of effective sanctions, if directors wish to ignore it for 
their own perceived short term advantage, or their employees’ or shareholders’ advantage, 
they will do so, and the problems, when they arrive, will be for someone to sort out at some 
stage in the future, long after they have  moved on, having cashed in their bonuses and their 
share options.    
 
 
The failure of s.172 
It has already been explained that s.172(1)(f) of the Companies Act 2006 can work well at a 
small company level in ensuring redress for some shareholders being treated badly by 
directors in terms of s.172(1)(f). In this respect one can take some small issue with the view 
of Elaine Lynch44 who asserts that “s. 172 brings little or nothing to the table”. But Lynch’s 
view in respect of the other parts of s.172, namely s.172(1)(a)–(e), would appear to be 
correct,  in that those provisions have proved in practice completely ineffective, at least as far 
as the large companies referred to earlier are concerned.  This view is also well advanced by 
                                                     
42 BBC News 5 February 2013, at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-21333527.  
43 For an expanded view of the same point, see N. Okoye, The BIS review and section 172 of 
the Companies Act 2006: what manner of clarity is needed?  2012, Company Lawyer. 33(1), 
15-16 
44 Lynch, Section 172: a ground-breaking reform of directors’ duties, or the emperor’s new 
clothes? 2012 Company Lawyer, (33(9), 196-203. 
Professor Andrew Keay.45  If this is correct, it suggests the requirement for directors to have 
regard to the various matters in s.172(1)(a)-(e) has moral suasion but no more. It is like 
patting a wolf on the head and asking it to be good. This does not mean that the provisions of 
that subsection are worthless, but rather that they are in practice sanctionless and therefore 
can afford to be ignored.  
S.172(1) was designed to make directors, in effect, behave well and to be good and 
thoughtful people when making directorial decisions. If directors did follow the precepts of 
s.172, the law might well alter business and social behaviour for the better. The evidence, so 
far, is that while s.172(1)(f) may be effective at a small company level, and as between 
directors and disgruntled shareholders, the rest of s.172(1) in the past was ignored by the 
directors of certain larger companies, did not alter business and social behaviour and that the 
gap between the intention of the legislation and the actuality is indeed wide.  
 
The redundancy of s.172(1) 
Notwithstanding all of the above, at the time of writing the banks are receiving such 
opprobrium that a cultural change is needed in order to regain customers’ trust. It will be 
commercial common sense that will now ensure that directors take more trouble to find out 
what is happening within their companies. It is not the fear of shareholder litigation under 
s.172(1)  that will cause directors to adopt the very behaviour that s.172(1) hopes to instil. It 
is the fact that the reputational damage of treating customers badly, and not playing by the 
rules, not surprisingly, in the long run has turned out to be bad for business. If a bank 
mistreats its customers, as Barclays and UBS did with LIBOR, and SSE did with those to 
whom it supplied electricity, it may well encourage at least some customers not to use those 
banks and companies again once the customers have found out what was happening.46 
Misleading customers, or treating them with contempt, either by not genuinely given the best 
deal they should be getting, or deliberately confusing them, can be, in the longer run, 
unprofitable. The cost to SSE of the fine (£10.5 million) and the reimbursement of the 
customers who were mis-sold electricity is greater than the amount of money that the 
company made by mis-selling (estimated to be £4 million).47 
 
A bank relies on the trust that the bank’s creditors, its depositors, will not all demand their 
funds back at once, thus causing a run on the bank, as happened with Northern Rock. The 
bank has to convince its customers/creditors that its funds are in safe hands. The evidence of 
the scandals above suggests that the hands of the directors (as the ones ultimately 
responsible) were not in those cases as safe as they might have been, and that some directors 
                                                     
45 Professor Keay has written extensively on this area (see 
http://www.law.leeds.ac.uk/assets/files/research/events/directors-duties/keay-the-duty-to-
promote-the-success.pdf   and  Moving towards stakeholderism? Constituency statutes, 
enlightened shareholder value, and more: much ado about little? E.B.L. Rev. 2011, 22(1), 1-
49,in particular) and his view is that s.172 has, frankly, not worked. He is not alone in this 
view: see D. Fisher, The Enlightened Shareholder -- Leaving Stakeholders in the Dark: Will 
Section 172 (1) of the Companies Act 2006 make Directors Consider the Impact of their 
Decisions on Third Parties [2009] I.C.C.L.R 10; 
46 Customers are notoriously reluctant to change theirs banks, but even if they do not change 
their banks, they are much more likely to be cautious about buying its products.  
47 See the Ofgem’s SSE – Notice of Intention to impose a financial penalty on SSE for failure 
to comply with Standard Licence Conditions 23 and 25 at para. 159, 3 March 2013. 
have now realised that they also need to be seen as clean and trustworthy hands.48 The 
paradox is that it has been commercial pressure and market forces, not s.172(1), that has 
ensured that lessons will have been learned – those lessons, ironically, being the same as 
those matters in s.172(1) to which directors are objured to “have regard”. The climate seems 
to be altering in favour of greater integrity in banking practice, at least as regards ordinary 
consumers. That it has altered is not as a result of s.172(1). It is because to continue as before 
is no longer commercially tenable. If this is the case, it almost suggests that the provisions in 
s.172(1)(a)-(e) are unnecessary. Sensible directors of a company would do what s.172(1) 
expects, without those requirements having to be put in legislation. 
 
Whether or not these provisions are unnecessary, s.172(1)(a)-(e) is not going to go away. 
Even if the statute is not effective, it is what is on the statute book and it is unlikely that 
Parliamentary time would be found for its amendment. Instead, at the time of writing the 
Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards is considering the Treasury’s proposal that 
directors of a bank should face criminal sanctions if found guilty of serious misconduct in the 
management of that bank.49 This suggestion is not without its difficulties, but the active threat 
of imprisonment and fines, not to mention the ignominy of conviction, may concentrate 
directors’ minds more effectively than s.172(1) appears to have done.    
 
One may then ask why the politicians and their civil servants allowed such ineffective 
legislation as s.172(1) onto the statute book.  There were warnings, particularly from some 
Conservative MPs,50 that what eventually became s.172(1) would cause more difficulties 
than it solved. What did not appear to have been anticipated, at least in public, was that the 
section would be ignored. It was complied with to the extent that the board minutes could 
demonstrate that directors had had regard to it, but the fact that the scandals referred to above 
took place at all suggests that amongst the many other tasks directors have to contend with, 
actually paying attention to s.172(1) was a very low priority. As for the politicians, it could 
be said that there was an emotional and sentimental attachment to what seemed a socially 
desirable objective, irrespective of the practical feasibility of that objective.51 By the time that 
the voting on the second reading of the bill was to take place, they had persuaded themselves 
that it was worthwhile, and as the Labour party, which was supporting the bill, was in a 
majority in the House of Commons at the time, there was no difficulty in getting the motion 
passed.52  
 
                                                     
48 Anthony Jenkins, current CEO of Barclays Bank, said it would take five to ten years to 
rebuild trust in banks (speech to Brooke House Sixth Form College, East London, 31st 
December 2013) reported at http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/antony-
jenkins-admits-it-could-take-10-years-to-rebuild-trust-in-barclays-9031350.html  
49 See the Treasury Discussion document, 3 July 2012, “Sanctions for the directors of failed 
banks”, available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/81565/consult
_sanctions_directors_banks.pdf  
50 See Hansard, House of Commons, 6 June 2006, Vol. 447 columns 204-5. 
51 One can compare this to another famous example of well-intentioned but completely 
unworkable legislation, namely the 18th Amendment to the American constitution, being the 
prohibition in 1920 on the production, sale and transport of alcohol. The 21st Amendment in 
1933 repealed the 18th Amendment. 
52 See Hansard House of Commons, 6 June 2006,Vol 447  column 219 
It is possible to say that the confusion of aims and absence of sanctions fatally undermined 
the benefit of this section, and that politicians should have been more alert to this. However, 
in the heat of the moment on the Parliamentary floor, one should not underestimate the 
understandable feeling for politicians of “something being done” towards a desirable 
objective even if there is no realistic penalty for the failure to achieve that objective.53  
 
Comparison with proposed legislation in Ireland 
It is telling that the current company law reform bill being discussed in the Republic of 
Ireland has made significant changes to many areas of company law – that country’s law 
being in many respects similar to UK law – but has expressly not introduced any attempt to 
draft directors’ duties in the manner shown in Companies Act 2006 s.172(1).54 The (Irish) 
Companies Bill, s.229(1), at present being discussed in the Dail, is the nearest equivalent to 
Companies Act 2006 s.172(1), but there is no mention of the need to have regard to the 
various stakeholders. There is instead a requirement to:  
(a)  act in good faith in what the director considers to be the interests of the company;  
(b)  act honestly and responsibly in relation to the conduct of the affairs of the company; 
(c)  act in accordance with the company’s constitution and exercise his or her powers only 
for the purposes allowed by law;  
(d)  not use the company’s property, information or opportunities for his or her own or 
anyone else’s benefit unless— 
(i) this is expressly permitted by the company’s constitution; or 
(ii) the use has been approved by a resolution of the company in general meeting; 
The simple but wide words “act honestly and responsibly in relation to the conduct of the 
affairs of the company” have much to commend them. It is evident from elsewhere in the Bill 
that the Irish have adopted much from the Companies Act 2006, but for good reason they did 
not replicate s.172(1). The words “honestly and responsibly” are particularly apt, and their 
lack of specificity is useful because it suggests that the directors should act honestly and 
responsibly not just to their companies, but to all those party to the “affairs of the company”. 
It does not resolve the irresoluble question of the duty to act responsibly only being owed to 
the company, but unlike s.172(1), as a duty it is easy for directors to understand and hard to 
avoid. It would be easy for a shareholder to point out that a director’s reluctance to ask, say, 
what its mis-selling sales representatives were doing, or why money-laundering was taking 
place, showed a failure to act honestly and responsibly. Were s.172(1) of the Companies Act 
2006 ever to be amended, there is much to be said for adopting the wording of the Irish 
Companies Bill s.229(1)(b).  
 
Conclusion 
The well-intentioned legislation on directors’ duties at s.172(1) of the Companies Act 2006 
designed to encourage better decision-making by directors, turned out to be ignored because 
                                                     
53 The Companies Act 2006 is not the only example of sanction-free legislation. For example, 
the Child Poverty Act 2010 sets out laudable targets for the reduction of poverty but the sole 
“threat” is that if the targets are not met, Parliament has to be told why. The now-abolished 
Fiscal Responsibility Act 2010 set out certain targets for the reduction of public sector net 
borrowing but expressly provided no sanction for the failure to meet those targets. There is a 
wider question to be asked as to whether imposing rules without penalties is an effective use 
of legislation.  
54 The author is not aware of the adoption of the wording of s.172(1) in the company law of 
any other Commonwealth country. 
there were no realistic sanctions for non-observance and no standing to sue for the 
stakeholders whose interests were apparently being protected.  
Ironically, the effects of the reluctance of directors to engage with the duties outlined in the 
legislation have been so detrimental to some companies’ interests that the only solution is for 
directors to start engaging with those very duties. However, this is not because the law says 
that they should do so, but because commercially there is no other option. In essence, in the 
UK, market forces policed directors a great deal better than the legislation did. The wording 
of s.172(1) has been ineffective. Simpler and less ambitious legislation would have been 
desirable. Instead of a complex series of requirements and a list of all the stakeholders to 
whom the directors should have had regard, ideally the current legislation should be repealed 
and the wording from s.229(1)(b) of the Irish Companies Bill used instead. 
   
 
